Don Barnett Collection

              6-4-07
Dear Friends in Waubay and the scholars in Waubay Junior High School:
Thank you so much for your note and your interest in the 1972 disaster in
Western South Dakota. Your questions are on target and certainly address
some of the horrific challenges that my generation of public servants and the
citizens of the region faced during the painful aftermath of that historic
flood. And historic it was. Last year, I read a list of the worst in-land
disasters relating to flooding in the history of our nation. These do not
include hurricanes. The flood that killed the largest numbers of people was
in Johnstown, PA. You can Google it up for the terrible details and history
of that event. David McCullough wrote the best history about that event. It
should be in your library or you can obtain a copy thru inter-library-loan. It
would make good summer reading. The in-land flood that killed the second
highest number of victims in the history of our nation was the Rapid City
flood in June, 1972. The South Dakota Event was, in deed, historic.
Now, your questions. After some thought, I have decided to number each of
your questions and answer them out of the order that you presented. I will
number each answer accordingly.
2. What were the major problems faced by the city after the
flooding..
It was a night of absolute terror. But the facts of the matter did not
come to our mind instantly. The Police Department alerted me about 6:30
that the United States Weather Service had alerted the Police Department
about the dangers from potentially high waters on Rapid Creek during the
next several hours. This warning was not unusual. Storms and gully­washers
are common in the Black Hills every summer. I called my best
advisor, Mr. Leonard Swanson, the City Public Works Director, and we met
at City Hall. Heavy rains were falling, and Mr. Swanson and I drove to
Canyon Lake Park where a city worker and his family lived in the park
caretaker's home, immediately below the dam. Swanny ordered the
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caretaker, a Parks Department employee, to immediately take his family,
leave their evening meal on the table, and get out of the park. The entire
family survived the flood. Not a trace of the home (it was city property) or
the contents was ever found. The Canyon Lake Damn failed a few hours
later. Swanny started to assemble his department heads and I remained on
the west side of town. By shortly after 7:00 pm on that Friday evening, the
water in Rapid Creek was roaring down the canyon between RC and Pactola
Reservoir.
A friend of mine (a dear friend who attended the church were my
family were also members), was working on a shut-off valve for a major gas
main that served homes above Canyon Lake. I got out of my car and helped
his crew pull on a big wrench. It was about five feet long. We were soaked.
As his men tightened the valve, the manager of the gas company put his arm
around my shoulder and he said, "Mr. Mayor! Somebody could get killed in
this thing." The "thing" was the early moments of the flood. It was an
understatement. The crew, Mr. George Miller, and I watched a car float
down Rapid Creek from just below the State Fish Hatchery and crash into
the bridge above Canyon Lake. Minutes later, the bridge failed and the car
and debris floated into Canyon Lake.
I had a police radio in my city car, and it also enabled me to monitor
the radio traffic for the South Dakota Highway Patrol. It was a racket. A
highway patrolman was begging for help near the small town of Black Hawk
where Box Elder Creek was flooding over the highway. He desperately
needed a boat to rescue some folks who were stranded in their car in the
creek. By this time, the small creek was a raging river. This is the creek that
drains an area north and west of the city and eventually runs near Ellsworth
Air Force Base. It does not run through Rapid City.
I rushed to a nightclub called the Canyon Lake Club and, en route, I
radioed to the Police Chief and asked him to meet me at a phone booth by
the parking lot. He arrived at the same time I did. We instantly agreed that I
should issue a warning to the biggest radio station and TV station in the city,
and I would ask that station to call the other stations with the same warning.
The newsman at the station understood the urgency of the moment and
recorded my warning. I asked the folks to immediately evacuate from all of
the neighborhoods near Rapid Creek and from every area in the city that had
a history of local flooding. I then remembered the distress for the highway
patrolman near Black Hawk and closed the alert with a request for anybody
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who lived on the west side of town to drag a boat to the bridge over Box
Elder Creek (near the old dog racing track) and meet the highway patrolman
there.
The radio and TV interrupted their programming, issued the warning,
and ran it almost continuously for about 30 minutes. The engineer also
called the other radio stations and asked them to make a recording of my
voice and run the warning non-stop. They stations cooperated.
Unfortunately, about 35 minutes after my first warning, the TV station
and radio stations lost their electrical power and went" off the air." They did
not broadcast again until the next morning.
Now the instant problems:
1. Uncertainty.
At dawn the next morning, the clouds settled down to ground level,
and a heavy fog covered all of Rapid City. The meteorologists later reported
that the absence of winds at certain elevations had caused the heavy rain
clouds between Pactola Reservoir and the city to hang in the canyons and
literally drip-dry during the night. Cells of up to 17 (some say 15 inches but
I have official reports in my files that claim 17 inches fell in certain regions)
of rain fell in the canyons, and the water gravitated to Rapid Creek. The
damaged areas along Rapid Creek in the city were about six miles long and
six blocks wide. It looked like a war zone. We knew we had heavy
casualties, but we did not have any idea about the eventual number (238).
Civil Defense under South Dakota law is a function of county
government. During the night, the County Commissioners set up the central
control point in the courthouse. By 5:00 in the morning, those survivors who
could travel to the courthouse started to arrive and gave the sheriffs office
crew (the dispatcher, the jail attendant, a few deputies and volunteers, and
the civil defense office staff) the names of family members and friends who
were missing. The commissioners and a few staff started accumulating the
lists of the missing persons. I stopped at the courthouse about 7:00 after I
was able to drive the city car from the north side of the creek over a partially
destroyed bridge to the south side of the creek. The look on the faces of the
folks who were reporting missing family members is still framed in my
memory. They feared the absolute worst but were praying for miracles.
Many broke down in the temporary offices with worry and fear.
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Words cannot define this fear and suffering. It was heartbreaking.
Later in the morning, more volunteers arrived to help write down hundreds
of names. With nobody to blame, it became a very confusing situation. The
business college in RC is across the street from the courthouse. A man from
the college saw the crisis and volunteered to permit the civil defense
professionals from the county and state to use the computers at the business
school and combine all of the names on dozens of lists and print a
consolidated list of the missing persons. Volunteer computer operators were
available to type the lists while the number of names was increasing rapidly.
By noon (if my memory is correct) the number was over 1,500. The list
grew longer through the next three days. However, there was order to the
process, and the civil defense folks and the county commissioners were
doing a good job. For the next several weeks the highest priority for city
government and the county government was to manage the missing list. The
degree of personal uncertainty for hundreds of families was sheer agony.
The county commissioners appointed a retired military man to manage that
list, and he was real pro. By the end of the summer, the list was down to
five names.
2. Bodies:
Throughout the night and during the early morning hours, the police
radio was reporting to the dispatcher the shocking and terrible facts of the
matter. The police were finding many bodies along Rapid Creek. By this
time, the waters had flooded the lower level of City Hall, power was off, and
the dispatcher and Police Chief drove a police car to the top of hill inside the
city. That car was the central dispatch point for the police department.
However, the Police Department could not receive telephone messages from
the citizens of Rapid City. Almost all of our off-duty policeman reported for
work during the night and worked with the night shift in the neighborhoods
near the creek. Also, our city had a police reserve of volunteers who
sometimes helped out the department with crowd management and
important services in the routine life of our city. We were in the middle of a
long campaign to control drunken drivers, and these volunteers always
played a big role in public safety issues in our city. These men and women
also reported for duty. Sadly, a lady in the police reserve perished that
terrible night as she was saving others.
I drove to the west side of town near the Meadowbrook Golf Course
and met Dr. Larry Lytle, the President of the City Council. He was standing
beside a police car that was towing a rental trailer. It was filled with bodies.
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Dr. Lytle was leading a group of volunteers and flood survivors who were
retrieving bodies from the rubble in the neighborhoods near the creek, the
golf course, and Meadowbrook School. I radioed the police chief, but he
had already heard about the trailer idea. All of our surviving police cars
(less than ten) went to the trailer rental business and used U-Haul trailers for
the next two or three days. The county civil defense office and Mr. Behrens,
the County Coroner, managed the distribution of the bodies to the various
funeral homes for the next several weeks. It was a county function.
Of course, during every hour of the crisis, Sheriff Glen Best and his
deputies worked closely with the police and volunteers in the rural areas
surrounding the city to search for survivors and deliver the victims to the
funeral homes. It was an on-going process for many, many days. Glen and
his force worked in the city and county and provided great service.
3. City Employees. Several were lost.
The fire chief and his men had worked gallantly all night to save the
folks from the raging waters in the creek. The chief informed me over a
police radio that three of his men were missing. We were not near each
other. Chief Johnson and his men were heroic throughout the night and
saved dozens of people. I was with one crew on the east side of town near
Roosevelt Park. The firemen and several men from the South Dakota
National Guard were using ropes and ladders to save the folks from the
raging (and very cold) waters. These courageous actions saved dozens of
victims from the flooding waters that also contained debris, parts of homes,
mobile homes, and other materials that clogged the bridges. The diverted
waters roared into neighborhoods far distant from the creek. Many bridges
broke apart. The roar of the noise can only be compared to a terrible train
wreck.
By Saturday noon the Chief told me the names of the missing men.
The body of the third firemen was not found until four or fives later, several
blocks downstream from Canyon Lake in Sioux Park.
4 The South Dakota National Guard.
By a fortunate coincidence, the SD National Guard had assembled in
Rapid City for their normal summer encampment and were at Camp Rapid
on the west side of Rapid City on that Friday evening. Under the leadership
of General Coming, the men instantly moved into a highly professional and
courageous rescue mode. They moved bulldozers, cranes, trucks, and other
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equipment to the banks of Rapid City and saved dozens and dozens of
victims. I had nothing to do with the assignment or use of these men, but
they are highly disciplined and well trained and worked absolute wonders
during the night and throughout the next several weeks. Without the
National Guard in Rapid City and the Black Hills, the number of casualties
would have been far higher. However, the price was high. Several
Guardsmen were killed as they put their life on the line to rescue and help
perfect strangers. This service is in the highest traditions of the South
Dakota National Guard and the people of our state. Every citizen of South
Dakota felt the pain.
5. Housing.
By mid-morning on Saturday, the water in Rapid Creek was back in
the stream and the period of high water was over. However, the flood was
not over! The county commissioners and civil defense workers were
bringing order to the courthouse. Regional and national reporters had word
of the disaster and were arriving by the dozens by 7:00 that morning. Also,
Governor Kneip, his senior staff, and many state civil servants were arriving
in Rapid City by convoy from Pierre. Federal officials from Denver were in
Rapid City by mid-afternoon. The airport had electrical power and was
operating for both private planes and commercial carriers.
The missing list was our highest priority. From time to time, I'd meet
a city council member, and we would discuss where the survivors would
sleep the first night and how long it would take to repair some of the
damaged homes. Nobody had a plan or a strong sense of direction on this
Issue.
During the same hours, local Red Cross workers and national leaders
of the Red Cross arrived in Rapid City to help. The President of the Red
Cross arrived from Washington on Sunday and supervised a system to pass
out funds to the survivors. His name was George Easley, and he had been
on President Truman's staff in the White House for years. I see his name in
the history books. He told me in early July that the Red Cross had passed
out over $200,000 to the disaster survivors, no strings attached. He is a great
friend to Rapid City.
The local commander of the Salvation Army and his wife were heroic
throughout the night. Sadly, the commander was killed while driving his
pickup into the waters to carry more folks to safety. His wife, in a state
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absolute grief, asked me to make the city auditorium (where the Dahl Fine
Arts Building is now located) available to the Salvation Army, and they
would provide meals for the survivors. Wes Storm, the city recreation
director, had the key and within two or three hours an army of volunteers
were serving hot meals. They managed the building throughout the summer
and fed thousands. The regional Commander from St. Louis became my
friend and told me the Salvation Army provided 27,000 meals during the
first few days after the flood.
5. Early decisions:
Federal officials arrived in Rapid City by Saturday noon and promised
to build several mobile home parks and provide new mobile homes for
hundreds of victims. This was a good plan but it would take time. Many
survivors returned to their destroyed homes and found only vacant lots.
Many homes were totally destroyed and unfit for occupancy. Frankly, I
don't know where those folks slept the first few weeks. Families, friends,
and strangers stepped forward to provide assistance.
On Saturday evening, we had an emergency meeting of the city
council and the council courageously announced some firm and very
controversial decisions. First, the city would not issue building permits to
repair homes that were over 50% damaged. We needed time to reach some
conclusions for the long-term recovery. Of course, some folks repaired their
homes without a permit. Secondly, the city would not permit federal funds
to be used to repair mobile home parks that were dangerously close to Rapid
Creek. As the death toll increased, we were told that some survivors could
not even find their mobile homes. The homes had been broken to bits by the
raging water.
6. Utilities:
The in-take system at the water treatment plant (where water from the
creek was normally prepared and treated for public consumption) near Rapid
Creek had been severely damaged. The city could not provide potable
water. Most of our wells were flooded and contaminated. Water lines had
ruptured, and several of the city reservoirs had drained dry. We had a
serious potential health problem on our hands.
Nobody in the city was surprised when citizens from every community in
the Black Hills arrived in Rapid City with trailers and a wide variety of
containers filled with potable water. The National Guard set up points in the
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city to provide drinking water to the entire city and used several military
potable water trailers. With sound leadership, these men worked with these
volunteers, set up potable water distribution points, and provided safe water
to our citizens. For homes where water pressure was still available, the folks
were told by the civil defense leaders to boil the water before drinking.
Within a few days, electricity and natural gas service was restored to some
neighborhoods. There was not a secondary episode of water born disease in
the flooded city or region. The council authorized emergency expenditures
for repairs to the water and sewer plant.
In short, the disaster was managed by the County Civil Defense
Department, but it was the city's job to restore normal public or city services
including, water, sewer service, open roads and bridges, police and fire and
public safety, and routine government services. Our 450 civil servants and
the Pennington County employees worked day and nights for several weeks
to bring their departments back on line. The price was very high. Two of
our public works employees also perished during that terrible night while
saving others in the neighborhoods where they lived.
The city had two hospitals, and one was located near the creek on the
west side of town. It had lost electrical power. I arrived at that hospital about
6:30 Saturday morning. A man had driven his Winnebago to the hospital and
was providing temporary electrical power from his little generator for
emergency use inside the structure. The patients were later discharged to
their homes or transferred to the larger hospital that had not lost electrical
power. This facility became the main point to provide care for hundreds of
the injured volunteers and flood survivors. The nurses and staff provided
wonderful care. Most of the doctors in the city reported to St. John's
hospital to manage triage and provide instant care for the victims and
volunteers. I never heard one complaint about the quality of care that was
provided at that overburdened hospital.
7. Physical and Emotional Strain.
By Sunday night, the pressures were taking a toll on the elected
officials from both the city and the country. Housing demand and the
missing persons list were overwhelming the local leaders. However, it was
at this moment that a wise man made a historic suggestion. Leonard
Swanson, a veteran of World War II and a registered Professional Engineer
with a degree from South Dakota State, was Public Works Director. All of
us looked to "Swanny" for advice and direction. He is, beyond a doubt in
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my mind, the most compassionate and highly skilled civil servant that I have
ever known. And a great friend to this day. At a moment of pure
exhaustion, when the pressures for housing and a theme of recovery were
most pronounced and severe, the city council and I met in the courthouse
and just about made a terrible mistake. The federal folks and the many local
folks wanted the city to repair the mobile home parks near the creek and
begin using the new mobile homes that were rolling into the Black Hills
from all over the Great Plains (under FEMA's management and control) and
were parked at Ellsworth Air Force Base). We just about made the decision
to allow folks to move back into the mobile home parks near Rapid Creek.
Swanny said, "We cannot sentence the survivors to one more night near
the creek in the suicidal floodplain." I wrote his comments down in my
spiral binder. We were shocked. His comments meant the city would never
permit the homes that were near the creek to be repaired and occupied again.
The council was unanimous in their support. Mr. Swanson's
comment became the first rule and the primary theme of our recovery. It
would be too stupid to rebuild hundreds of destroyed or damaged homes by
the creek and allow the survivors to return to their dangerous residential lots
in the deepest areas of the Rapid Creek floodplain. Lt. Tommy Hennies of
the RCPD drove Swanny home to finally get a few hours of sleep, but he
was back in the saddle the next morning.
E. Economics
The national reporters were reporting the disaster thoroughly and
professionally. However, by Sunday, the level of tourism and visitor
numbers at Mt. Rushmore was drastically down. We faced the potential of a
second disaster with a complete collapse of the 1972 tourism system. Folks
from throughout the nation believed the highways to Mt. Rushmore and the
Black Hills were under water. We needed a plan and needed it fast.
Governor Kneip and his staff saw the problem, went to work, and
provided state funds for an immediate national and regional advertising
campaign to advise the nation that the Black Hills were open for business.
This campaign had a significant economic impact upon the entire state. We
also asked the regional and national reporters to put out the word that the
Black Hills could not survive a second disaster if visitors failed to visit
South Dakota in 1972. We received wonderful cooperation.
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Mr. John Palmer was the morning newsman on the Today Show over
NBC, and he had covered the flood for two or three days. He asked me to
do a live interview at 5:00 one morning during the first week from the
studios at KOTA. We talked about the disaster for a few minutes and then he
gave me 12 minutes of broadcast time to talk about tourism. It was free
advertising for South Dakota, and I explained that the interstate highways,
state highways, and the major attractions were safe and open for business.
We received hundreds of inquiries at the office, and Mrs. Kay Rippentrop,
the long-time Mayor's Assistant, answered every request for materials. The
State Department of Tourism also answered thousands of requests for travel
information and poured more money into advertising. Little by little, the
number of visitors returned to about 90% of normal by the 4th of July. From
that point forward, it was a banner year.
Number Two:
How did Rapid City, the State of South Dakota, and the federal
government work together to help rebuild the areas damaged in the
1972 disaster?
As explained above, the federal officials from FEMA, (the Federal
Emergency Management Agency) arrived in Rapid City by noon on
Saturday. I must not fail to define the skill of these wonderful civil servants.
President Nixon had appointed very strong and talented folks to manage this
important federal agency. These were not political hacks. These were
skilled and compassionate folks, and they brought along the financial muscle
of the federal treasury and the firm direction by Congress to help regions
that were defined as Federal Disaster areas. President Nixon defined Rapid
City and the four-county disaster zone as a national disaster on Saturday
morning, and the federal folks arrived to help.
Debris removal and body search were key components of their duties.
The Corps of Engineers was instantly available to manage debris removal
and hired local and regional contractors to haul debris to an old city quarry
on the west side of town in South Canyon and the city landfill on the east
side of town. The feds were paying the bills and calling the shots and the
locally elected leaders were keeping out of the way. By Sunday, these
contractors were making real progress. In the process, the crews found more
bodies. It was gruesome duty with plenty of tears by all of us, including the
city's 29-year old mayor.
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The federal government divides the nation into several regions to
administer federal programs. In Denver, the Mt. Plains Council of Federal
Agencies (16 cabinet level agencies) was led by Mr. Robert Rosenheim, the
regional Director of Housing and Urban Development. These agencies meet
frequently to cohesively manage their duties and attempt to avoid
overlapping, duplication, waste, and delay in the delivery of federal services.
Representatives of these agencies arrived in Rapid City, went on TV, and
told the folks how the federal government would help. However, it was not
a cohesive message and all of it was confusing to local officials and the
general public. They were speaking "federalese", and most of us did not
even understand the terms of the discussion. The federal agencies had never
before managed an in-land disaster of this magnitude, and many of the
officials were just "winging it," - - just like most of us on the local level. On
Sunday night, I met with Mr. Rosenheim and asked him to return to Denver
a get a plan together. We could not understand the alphabetical soup
programs that these folks were discussing, and we had dozens of local and
pressing issues to manage. Bob understood immediately and gathered the
federal officials together and returned to Denver.
Bob told me a most interesting story. The next morning, in Denver, a
letter from President Nixon arrived at Bob's office. Mr. Rosenheim was
designated by President Nixon to be the federal lead man for all federal
actions relating to the National Disaster in South Dakota. Bob was given
unusual authority to speak for the President as he coordinated the federal
response from 16 federal agencies that are based in Denver. He brought
order to the chaos and carried that letter is his suit pocket for several years.
When there was a dispute among the federal agencies, Bob sorted it out and
the other senior Nixon appointees understood that any appeal to Washington
would be overruled by the President. The entire federal response was both
generous and effective. The agencies met around the clock until they had a
plan. Later that week, Bob called me and we agreed to meet the next
morning for breakfast.
It is critical to understand that the flood did not just impact Rapid
City. Areas in four counties were damaged, and the elected officials from
those jurisdictions provided wisdom and insight in the general theme of the
recovery. They had urgent and pressing needs that also required local, state,
and federal attention. It was imperative for the plan to involve every unit of
local government that was impacted by the 1972 flood.
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Larry Finnerty, an engineer who worked for the City, joined me and
Mr. Swanson for the breakfast meeting with Mr. Rosenheim. After an hour
or two of serious listening, Larry drew a sketch on the back of a napkin to
show how the Mr. Plains Council of 16 Federal Agencies in Denver would
work closely with elected leaders from the Four County Disaster Area. It
was simple, understandable, and a profoundly wise concept. We shook
hands, and the birth of the recovery plan was in place. Larry refined the
chart, and we shared copies with all of the local officials in the four-county
area, the newspaper, TV and radio stations, reporters, and the planning
started to take place. The chart was just for discussion until it could be
approved by each unit of local government. After several regional meetings,
the approvals were in place, and local officials continued the management of
serious planning procedures. The plan accomplished the mission. The
mission was to help the victims as rapidly as possible, create programs to
prevent the loss of life and property in future disasters, and move forward
without overlapping, duplication, and delay in the delivery of federal, state,
and local services. Governor Kneip signed off on the plan with his approval.
The governor also immediately briefed the leaders of the legislature, and
there was little protest. A man on the governor's staff, Herb Teske,
remained in Rapid City for the entire summer and was the governor's right
hand man. He was also a Colonel in the National Guard and worked closely
with General Coming to keep the National Guard Commander informed on
each stage of the recovery in the early weeks of that terrible summer.
There was one agency that was much more cumbersome. The Corps
of Engineers has tremendous power and authority and seems to be
independent of congress and sometimes even the President. The leaders of
the Corps of Engineers in Omaha never joined with the other federal
agencies in our "treaty" but they did provide strong service to South Dakota.
At first, that service was mostly the coordination of debris removal. That
process went along as well as could be expected. The feds and FEMA paid
for all of it. On other issues, the Corps was arbitrary and would not agree to
the target dates and policies that were part of the plan Mr. Rosenheim and
his staff had prepared. We worked though these issues over the next few
years. The last component of the recovery plan to be implemented by the
Corps of Engineers is the preserved wetland area behind the Baken Park
Shopping Center and south of the new West Main Bridge. The Corps came
through in the end and did their job.
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Question Number Three: How did the HUD (Housing and Urban
Development) housing program work?
As defined above, by Sunday night the council had agreed to keep the
flood victims out of the floodplain until the major theme of the recovery
could be worked out by all of the governmental agencies. However, the city
council had two terrible and pressing issues on their minds and hearts: I,
How do we financially help the survivors? 2, How can government create
policies and programs and a theme of recovery to prevent similar disaster for
happening again, and how can government prevent the loss of life in future
floods in the urban floodplain in Rapid City? Here is the foundation of both
questions:
1. The survivors, like most Americans, had mortgages on their homes
and those monthly payments had to be paid. Hundreds of homes were
virtually gone or in a condition where they could never be repaired.
The survivors also required new and safe housing. Within a few
weeks, the FEMA mobile home parks were operational, and hundreds
of families moved into the new mobile homes. However, these were
temporary homes and not the answer to the long term housing
shortage. The survivors were living with their family members, in the
homes of their friends, in motels, and trying to repair their damaged
homes as rapidly as possible.
2. The floodplain in Rapid City has a long history of flooding, and lives
had been lost during several previous floods.
A. 1907: Four lives lost in a flash flood. Canyon Lake destroyed.
B. 1920: Eight lives lost in a flood.
C. 1952: Many homes damaged in a regional flood.
D. 1962: Two flooding events involving 400 damaged homes,
120 damaged or destroyed mobile homes, and the temporary
evacuation of 1,500 people from the urban floodplain.
(Please see the following website):
http://www.crh.noaa.gov/unr/iwe/1972/0ther Black Hills Fl
oods/index.htm
Floods will certainly happen again in Rapid City where the 1972
victims and survivors had lived. Could the city somehow stop this
cycle of flooding and prevent the loss of life and property. The
answer to these questions did not come easily, and they did not come
soon. Again, the wisdom of Robert Rosenheim some into the recovery
equation. Bob had been chairman of the City of Denver's Urban
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Renewal Authority for many years and understood the federal
cookbook for all forms of the complex federal housing programs. As
part of these formulas, if HUD provided funds to buy land or older
homes at market price and then create new housing projects on that
land, the original owners were paid, by law, for the market value of
the old or substandard home. The federal government also paid the
original homeowners a relocation payment as an incentive to willingly
sell their land and move or relocate their families to enable HUD to
build new and better homes on the land. These relocation payments
were significant.
Then, a few days after the Rapid City flood, in a historical
coincidence, areas of Wilkes-Barre eastern Pennsylvania were
severely damaged by Hurricane Angus. It was a monster hurricane
that caused more damage in Pennsylvania than the states in the South.
The congressman from that area of PA was (coincidentally) Mr. Dan
Flood. The congressman and his staff demanded the federal
government provide 30-year term, 1% mortgages for the Pennsylvania
flood victims. The loans would enable the disaster victims in his
district to use low interest federal loans for replacement housing. The
Small Business Administration had staff to manage the application
process and was the logical agency to get the job done.
The Congressman from western South Dakota, Mr. Jim
Abourezk (a courageous statesman and effective public servant who
went on to great service in the United States Senate), and his staff had
worked in full cooperation with local governments, Governor Kneip
and his staff, .and the federal agencies since the early hours of the
disaster. Jim immediately demanded to his friend, Congressman
Wright Patman from Texas, the Chairman of the House Banking
Committee, that the legislation to create the special Small Business
Administration or SBA loans also include the requirement to make the
same loans available to victims of the South Dakota Disaster. It was a
brilliant legislative maneuver.
I cannot remember all of the details, but within a few hours Mr.
Rosenhiem called me and the city council and our senior department
heads to a conference call. He had some sound ideas and said
something like this, "If the SBA will provide your victims with 30-
year term, 1% loans, maybe *(with no promises) HUD (where he was
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the regional administrator and could call the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, Former Governor George Romney of Michigan,
or even call President Nixon if necessary for help) could provide a
Housing and Urban Development grant in federal funds to permit the
city government in Rapid City to buy the damaged homes and the
lands in the urban floodplain from the flood victims. HUD could,
maybe, provide the money to buy the lands and also provide
relocation payments to the families, and the city could clear and own
the lands."
Somebody said, "And the vlctlms can build and own new
homes in areas that are not flood prone and will be safe for this and
future generations to use and enjoy."
Somebody suggested the city could buy the lands and create a
long recreational avenue along both sides of Rapid Creek from
Canyon Lake to the Pennington County Fairgrounds, and the lands
would never be used for housing again."
Somebody said, "And we'll buy the businesses that are now
dangerously close to Rapid Creek and relocate them to safe areas too."
I'm only sure of one thing. The best ideas did not come from
me, but I was writing down all of the ideas. It was brightest moment
of the recovery since the rains fell on that terrible Friday night. Over
the next few weeks, the plan evolved. The city council held meeting
in every neighborhood in the city to benefit from public involvement
in the eventual plan. The plan got better and better as the concept
evolved and the council listened to the wisdom of the people. It was
democracy at its best. Rapid City was eventually included in the 1972
Federal Disaster Recovery Act, and the SBA provided hundreds of
loans to help our victims (including a special program for folks who
had been living in rental housing that was destroyed in the flood).
The victims also enjoyed the benefits of the recovery plan.
By August, the City Council finished the long and complex
federal application for funding from HUD. It called for a $60 Million
federal grant to enable the City to buy the lands in the flood plain.
The city had surveyed the lands during June and July, and could now
define the floodplain for the 100 year flood and a potential 500-year
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flood. Mr. Rosenheim marshaled his forces and personally carried
the application to Washington. In September, Vice President Agnew
came to Rapid City and announced the approval of a $48 Million
grant for disaster recovery. Secretary Romney brought the contact to
Rapid City in late October, and the council authorized me to sign and
accept it.
The Arithmetic: This is important for future generations to
understand. The final terms of the SBA loans included these facts:
A. Through a complex appraisal process the city purchased the
vacant lot and the damaged homes (or the concrete foundations)
at a post-flood value. This money was used by the victim to
partially pay down their original mortgage.
B. The new loan included funds to payoff the balance of the flood
victim's original mortgage on their demolished or damaged
home.
C. The SBA loans included the cost of the victim's new home.
D. The HUD grant also provided a relocation payment for each
family to help the victims get on their feed in their new home.
E. Do the math. The new payment (calculated at a rate of 1% over
a 30-year term) was close to what the original mortgage
payment (at 6-7% interest, over a 20-year term loan) had been
before the flood. Property taxes were probably a little more on
the more expensive and new homes.
F. Better yet, the victims (35 years after the flood) now own their
home in a safe location and enjoy and benefit from the real
estate appreciation.
G. The saving and loan associations and banks in RC that had
loaned the money on the original mortgages were paid back.
None the Sand L's failed due to loans that were unwisely made
to the homeowners on floodplain lands before the flood. The
program was a bail-out for the banks and savings and loan
association. Their customers would have never been able to
payoff those loans without the federal assistance. Everyone in
SD should remember this when we start to damn and condemn
the federal government. The federal taxpayers were very
generous to the victims of the 1972 disaster.
H. The total federal expenditure in the Four County Disaster Area
during the first five years of the 1970s was approximately $170
Million. In 2002 dollars the cost would be approximately $650
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Million (by a 2002 estimate by the USGS). See the website
above with the history of previous floods.
Question Number Four: What positive changes resulted in Rapid City
because of the flooding in 1972?
In general, the HUD program answered both challenges that the City
Council faced in the early summer of 1972.
1. Low interest loans helped the victims, over the long term, acquire
and own replacement housing in safe locations.
2. Nobody was (or is) permitted to live in the floodplain.
3. The land was immediately zoned as park land. It now requires a
vote of the people to sell even one square foot of the floodplain for
commercial and residential use.
4. Future and current generations in Rapid City now enjoy dozens of
recreational features on the expanded floodplain park system
including a hiking and biking trail system, soccer fields, and ball
fields. The city owns and maintains several square miles of park
land that is close to every neighborhood in the city. Thousands of
citizens and visitors visit the park. Nobody sleeps there. The
Rapid City Chamber of Commerce defines the floodplain park as a
city treasure and pledges to guard and protect the floodplain from
sale and future violations for home and business locations.
5. Over 100 business owners sold their damaged structures and lands
to the city and relocated to new and safe sites by using the 1%, 30-
year term loans.
6. Future floods in varying magnitudes will again occur along the
banks of Rapid Creek. Park and recreational lands will be
damaged. However, the loss of life and personal property will be
much less severe than in the 1972 flood.
7. The HUD program enabled the city to also acquire land for the
new Rapid City Central High School, the Rushmore Plaza Civic
Center, and several properties in downtown Rapid City where
private investors purchased the cleared lands from the Urban
Renewal Agency and built new offices and businesses in the
central business district to strengthen the city's tax base and
provide employment in the downtown area.
8. Public safety personnel will not be forced to risk life and limb for
as many future rescue procedures during Rapid City's next big
flood.
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9. Perimeter land values near the beautiful lineal park have increased
in value due to the proximity of the park to these lands.
10. Rapid City has not had to ask the federal government for disaster
recovery funds from any natural disaster since the aftermath of the
1972 flood. In short, the comprehensive program will save the
federal and local taxpayers money over the short-term and long-term.
Conclusion:
These lessons in urban floodplain management came at a horrendous
price. None of us who went through the grief and strain will ever be the
same. This recovery did not happen on a massive and instant scale. It
happened as civil servants employed by the City Council met with one
family at a time and explained the complex procedures. Most of the victims
were cooperative, and less than 10% of the families/victims forced the city
to use imminent domain procedures to set the price for purchase of the lands.
Nevertheless, it is not pleasant to force hundreds of folks (about I, I00
families) out of their long established homes. The transitions for the elderly
survivors of the flood were particularly painful and filled with stress. One
lady who lived 40 yards behind the Baken Park Shopping Center on the west
side of Rapid Creek cried to our staff and begged to stay in her home. She
said, "This little house is all I have left. If you let me live here, I'll donate
my home to the city after I pass away." Mr. Swanson and his staff were also
in tears. The city purchased her home, and she moved away from Rapid
City. It was a heavy price to pay for safety in the urban floodplain.
Now, 35 years later, many challenges remain for the city and its
taxpayers. Several years ago, the people voted overwhelmingly to stop and
prohibit the sale of 10 acres of floodplain land in the most narrow part of the
floodplain (the Gap, just below M-Hill). The margin was not close. The
people of Rapid City cherish and will preserve their park system.
Now, in 2007, a short-sighted developer is again eyeing land that is
close to the creek and using a technicality to rationalize the development of
over 30 apartments very close to the creek. That long-established Rapid
City family should not leave a legacy with a major and significant violation
of these terribly low lands for residential use near the creek. It would be a
crime to expose 30 families to the eternal dangers from future floods on
Rapid Creek above Canyon Lake. If this project is built, national
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guardsmen, city firemen and policemen, and public works employees will
have to risk their life to rescue the folks who will be living so near to the
creek during future floods. All of the floodplain should remain a
recreational avenue from the west end of the city to the east end.
During my short four years of service as mayor, the city was fortunate
to have two fine professors from the South Dakota School of Mines serve on
the City Council. One economist, Mr. Earl Hausle, was also a fine historian.
His hobby was Indian lore in Paha Sapa or the Black Hills. After the flood,
he traveled to the Pine Ridge Reservation to discuss Indian lore and history
with several tribal elders and prepared an oral or historical (recorded) report
of his discussions. He asked the leaders about the Rapid City flood. One
gentleman said, "The Indian tribes never camped or lived near the creeks
that flow out of the east side ofPaha Sapa."
Earl asked, "Why not?"
The man said, "Too many bears! Too many floods."
I wish the students of Waubay Junior High much success with your
history project and sincerely hope these comments will help you complete
your research. Congratulations on your scholarship.
Please don't forget to read that book by Mr. McCullough. Have a
mce summer.
Thank you.
Don Barnett
Mayor of Rapid City, 1971-1975
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